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BOOK REVIEW
LAND DEVELOPMENT IN CROWDED PLACES: LESSONS FROM ABROAD.

By George Lefcoe. Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation,
1979. Pp. 151 plus xi. (hard cover). $13.50.
REVIEWED BY

A.

DAN TARLOCK*

In the past two decades a widespread dissatisfaction with the results of
private and public land development has arisen both in the United
States and in Europe. It is argued that too much land is being shifted
from less to more intensive uses. Rural land is being converted from
farms and fields into a variety of higher density residential, commercial, and industrial uses, while the scale of urban neighborhoods is being distorted by high-rise buildings and other large-scale projects built
according to sophisticated profit formulas.
This pattern of land development should not be surprising, especially in the United States. The constant shift of land from less to more
intensive uses was once considered progress. In the 19th century, land
use shifts were encouraged by a law based on the virtues of exclusive
control by private owners, and a public domain disposition policy that
tried, often unsuccessfully, to put land into the hands of those who
would use it most productively. In the 20th century, public domain
policy changed from land disposition to retention and management,'
and the Blackstonian vision of exclusive control over the use and disposition of privately held property underwent modest modifications in response to the pressures of urban development.2 After the Supreme
Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Really Co.3 upholding
the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning ordinances, the right of
*

Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. A.B. 1963, LL.B. 1965, Stanford

University.
1. L. PEFFER,

THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND RESERVATION POLICIES 1900-1950 (1951).

2. See Babcock & Feurer, Land As a Commodity "Affected with a Public Interest," 52
WASH. L. REV. 289, 291-99 (1977).
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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the government to intervene in land use and development choices has
been accepted with little question.
Public regulation of land use was easily accomplished because the
objectives of the regulation were basically consistent with the needs of
the land development industry.4 In developed neighborhoods, property owners did not object to zoning because they got what they desired-the assignment of collective property rights that retained the
status quo and were simultaneously administered by the city.5 Owners
of vacant land were not always wildly enthusiastic about zoning; however, they did not fare too badly in most instances. Zoning and other
land use controls did not attempt to buck the market; they only attempted to accommodate market-dictated shifts by ensuring minimum
compatibility with surrounding uses.
In the 1970's the theory that the principal function of land use
regulation was the accommodation of change came under a vigorous,
although unfocused, attack. It was alleged that the theory was generally destructive of environmental values and had failed to respond to
housing supply demands. Accordingly, a better alternative was needed,
and when Americans have wanted something better, they have often
looked back across the Atlantic to Europe. Professor Lefcoe has carried forward this tradition of borrowing from Europe in his informative
new b6ok, Land Development in Crowded Places. Lessons From
Abroad.
Land Development in CrowdedPlaces is the product of research in
German and Dutch land development funded by the Conservation
Foundation and prompted by the American perception of European
cities as better places to live. For example, the "City Beautiful" movement of the 19th century sought, somewhat ironically, to transform
democratic America into a physical copy of aristocratic Europe.6 The
perception that European cities are preferable places to live because
they do a better job of controlling the scale of urban growth and of
regulating the conversion of open land to more intensive uses is widespread among planners, architects, and students of urban planning, and
is the working assumption of Professor Lefcoe's study. His basic thesis
is that European models of land use development can remedy the chief
4.

See D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA (1970).
See R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 19-20 (1977).
6. See M. ScoTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 45-46 (1969).

5.
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defect in American land use controls-the lack of a satisfactory affirmative mechanism that will achieve a desired plan.
In our system the debate over the results of urban development
occurs as a debate over the process of urban development. Those who
object to the results of the process generally fail to present a dynamic
alternative model. In contrast to what is being attempted with air and
water pollution, one cannot pursue a nondegredation policy with respect to land. Thus, the results are attacked indirectly by the argument
that greater participation in the choice over a land use conversion must
be had by those groups affected, and by the related argument that the
state must ultimately play a more direct role in that land use choice.
The three principal chapters of the book are organized according to
three proposed solutions to this conversion problem: (1) that the choice
be shared between the property owner and his neighbors; (2) that the
choice be shared between the title holder and the government by a rule
that makes development a privilege not a right and thus, in a sense,
makes the private developer and the city joint venturers; and (3) that
there be direct subordination of private to public choice by making
government the primary land developer while relegating the property
owner to the status of an agent, executing the government's development plan, with the right to a reasonable return on the value of his
land.
LandDevelopment in CrowdedPlaces is a collection of three essays
published in law reviews over the past five years. For the book, the
author has made slight revisions in the three articles, placing them between an introduction and an epilogue. Few contemporary scholars
have such a firm grasp of the dynamics of modern real estate markets,
the complex patchwork of federal and state real estate subsidy programs, and the theories and impacts of public controls such as zoning
and subdivision regulations as does Professor Lefcoe. The essays therefore make lively and worthwhile reading as they are filled with interesting information concerning European land development regulation
systems that throw considerable light on the American system. However, the book suffers somewhat from a lack of integration among the
three essays. Lack of integration is especially a handicap in a comparative study such as this. Property use concepts and land development
concepts, because of the cultural context in which they arise, are often
difficult to compare. Often, a question concerning the relevance of a
concept to the American experience raised in one chapter cannot be
fully answered until one finds, by chance, the relevant information in
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another chapter. This is, however, a minor quibble. The book is concise, well written, and a sufficient source of information for the reader
to form an independent preliminary judgment about the merits of the
remedies Professor Lefcoe urges us to consider.
I.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS

Throughout the world, a familiar scenario has been enacted for as long
as man has lived in cities. An urban neighborhood grows or "evolves"
to a certain scale over time and people, often at the lower rungs of the
social order, find their niche there. Then the central government, hereditary or elected, decides to "improve" the area with a modern project that will replace the current residents of the area with others higher
on the social scale.7 Until recently, those objecting to progress were
accorded little sympathy, and they certainly lacked the political power
to oppose the project effectively.8 In the past two decades the plight of
neighborhood dwellers threatened by progress has improved somewhat
because of a widely shared belief that present residents should have
more power than the government or potential future residents to shape
their destiny, and because of an increasingly skeptical view of the benefits of large-scale publicly subsidized development. 9 Because the
financial stakes in any power sharing are very high, just how much
power the government must share with its citizens has not yet been
resolved.
The first essay begins with short accounts of three conflicts that
illustrate different forms of shared power.'" First, the successful defense of the Rock in Sydney, Australia-the birthplace of the nation
and its flinty character-exemplifies the development of both a right of
advance notice for large-scale plans and of procedural participation in
the formulation of those plans. Second, when Covent Garden lost its
famed market, the area became ripe for intense development as central
London has no more attractive underdeveloped areas. Such development has been forestalled, in part, because neighborhood protection
7.
See generall, S. GEER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES (1965); J. JACOBS, THE
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).

8. For a lucid analysis of the politics and aesthetics of a celebrated 19th century urban
development, Vienna's Ringstrasse, illustrating this point, see C. ScHORSKE, FIN-DE SIECL9 VIENNA, Ch. 2 (1980). The "Ring" consists of a series of Prachtbauten (buildings of splendor)
designed for the Dual Monarachy's liberal elite and aristocracy to the exclusion of almost everyone else.
9.
10.

(1979).

See H. GANS, PEOPLE AND PLANS (1968).
G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT IN CROWDED PLACES: LESSONS FROM ABROAD 16-36
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groups were able to certify themselves informally as the collective bargaining liaison between area residents and city planners. In some instances, neighborhood groups will be unable to block or to modify a
project, and the issue then becomes one of the amount of compensation
due to the displaced groups. The final case study, the redevelopment of
San Francisco's "skid row," sketches the expansion of the standard of
compensation from the value of what was taken, a standard widely perceived as inadequate, to the costs of reestablishing oneself in comparable surroundings. There, those who would benefit from the planned
project financed relocation housing for those displaced.
Together, the three case studies raise the difficult issue of what
rights and remedies should be accorded those asserting the status quo
or limited development. In the past decade, lawyers, courts, and legislatures have naively attempted to avoid determining the property rights
of neighbors in collective goods such as amenity levels, and instead
have offered them a variety of due process rights." I We now see more
clearly the limits of due process alone. Participation rights are costly,
provide no assurance to any major interest group that its interest will
prevail, and are often an inefficient allocation of resources with no offsetting distributional benefits. In his initial essay, -Professor Lefcoe
wisely rejects providing neighbors with a veto through mechanisms that
in effect assign property rights to the status quo. However, he proposes
a neighborhood bill of rights, which incorporates elements from each of
2
the three case studies, and nearly sanctions a defacto veto.'
In the epilogue, Professor Lefcoe retracts much of this proposal by
recognizing that many excluded uses may be beneficial to the community:
In my initial essay, I underestimated the frequency with which
11. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667,
1711-60 (1975).
12. Meanwhile perhaps we are ready to consider the creation of legal guidelines to protect all the world's great cities, so that neighborhood defenders will no longer be needed
to stand as impregnable walls against urban change. Perhaps we are ready for the drafting of a bill of rights for neighborhood defenders. Such a bill would encompass the
procedural assurances of a right of actual notice to residents, whether owners or tenants,
and a hearing in the neighborhood on any plans, even preliminary ones, that could result
in major changes in the area. The bill should provide, when plans are controversial and
no quick compromises can be reached, for the designation of an officially constituted
neighborhood assembly authorized to bargain with planners and developers on the
neighborhood's behalf. Finally, if disruptive change must come, all those affected-even
tenants-should be idemnified, and for the most serious losses, there should be a forum
for adjudicating claims for compensation that would have as its dual objects to make
both individuals and the urban place whole.
G. LEFCOE, supra note 10, at 37-38.
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politicians and planners, eager to avoid confrontations, would capitulate to neighborhood groups, in effect tendering them a veto power
over new development. Instead of seeking to mitigate the harms of
development, many of these groups seek nothing less than to halt
new development altogether. . . . [Collective bargaining cannot
function as an accommodation model unless all parties
to the negoti3
ation have something to gain by compromising.'
Given that procedural reforms are usually offered to avoid the underlying and often unreconcilable value conflicts giving rise to the dispute,
this reviewer can only agree.
II.

THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP LAND

Allocating additional power to neighborhood groups can only be fully
evaluated with reference to the land development laws of a country
where the expectations of neighborhoods are well established. Professor Lefcoe's suggested bill of rights is a rule making development both
a right and a privilege. In Holland and Germany, a landowner can
develop more or less as a matter of right only in areas designated for
development, provided that the scale of the project remains compatible
with the existing or projected neighborhood scale.' 4 Neighbors' interests are defined as compatibility with the proposed project rather than
as the status quo. This method is a more explicit collective property
rights solution than the one Professor Lefcoe advocates for neighbors
protesting the scale of development. Still, the compatibility standard,
as illustrated by case studies of development in Amsterdam, allows for
considerable change while at the same time protecting the residents'
interests in neighborhood stability.
In the United States, neighbors' rights have occasionally been recognized in the continuation of the existing scale of development.' In
general, however, third party protestors to a zoning decision have no
well-recognized expectations of the scale of a new development. From
the time that zoning controls were widely adopted to the environmental
concerns of the 1970's, a simple rule concerning the landowner's opportunity to develop his land was in existence. One could develop as a
13. Id at 150.
14. Id at 43-62.
15. Neighbors have the strongest expectations that the scale of the status quo will be continued under the Maryland change or mistake rule, see, e.g., Chapman v. Montgomery County
Council, 259 Md. 641, 271 A.2d 156 (1971), and in jurisdictions such as Oregon which have
adopted a variant of the rule at the same time that map amendments have been reclassified as
quasi-judicial acts. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 514, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Neuberger v. Portland, 288 Ore. 155, 603 P.2d 771 (1979).
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matter of right so long as one conformed to applicable, yet modifiable,
regulations. The function of zoning was not to decide if land use
changes could occur but only to accommodate the change to the immediate area. In contrast, European countries formally characterize land
development as a privilege not as a right.
In the past two decades, the cumulative impact of growth limitations, the increased procedural requirements for change mechanisms,
and the increased reliance on site plan review has been to turn development from a right into a privilege. As Professor Lefcoe notes, "In
many communities the right to develop has been almost entirely removed from private landowners."' 6 Since this nation has moved in a
highly ad hoc fashion to make development a privilege, the European
experience under this principle becomes highly relevant, and somewhat
embarrasing, for the United States. The thesis of Chapter Two, The
Right To Develop Land- The German andDutch Experience, is that the
European practice of land development is fairer both to the property
owner and to producers' gains to society, in the form of a higher quality
environment. In the United States, the costs of development seem to
have increased substantially with no demonstrable gain to the public
except the preservation of a few more fields and hillsides of limited use
to the public.
To operate a system that both promotes housing opportunity
through policies furthering compact high density development and improves environmental quality through the preservation of large
amounts of contiguous open space, it is essential to demarcate clearly
where development shall and shall not occur. Once this basic allocation is made, development must be allowed to proceed with minimum
restrictions in those designated areas as compensation for severe restrictions elsewhere. This is exactly the system Germany and the
Netherlands have adopted and the United States has been unable to
adopt, except in limited instances. We continue to experiment with urban-rural zoning,' 7 land development polices tied to the provision of
sewer and water service,' 8 federal tax incentives for the donation of
16. G. LEFCOE, supra note 10, at 39.
17. See Myers, LegalAspects of.AgriculturalDistricting,55 IND. L.J. 1 (1979-1980) and Geir,
AgriculturalDistricts and Zoning: A State-LocalApproach to a National Problem, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 655 (1980).
18. See Deutsch, CapitalImprovements Controls as Land Use ControlDevices, 9 ENVT'L L.
61 (1978).
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open space,' 9 differential property taxation,20 transferrable development rights to name a few.2 ' Only when areas have established the
opportunity to purchase development rights directly 22 have programs
to preserve open space been successful that do not depend upon public
ownership of parks or upon lands open to the public.
The goals of compaction and open space appear easier to accomplish in Germany. German cities, along the lines of the English Greenbelt model, have divided lands among Aussenbereich and Innenbereich
districts. The former are lands outside the area dedicated for development and must be left to traditional agricultural and open space uses;
the latter are areas designated for planned development. Some provision is made for extensions of the Innenbereich.23 However, the dedications to open space required in return for an extension of the
Innenbereich,which run beyond the conventional payments of land extracted in the United States to hospitals and townhalls, decrease the
developer's profit and thus lessen the pressure on developers to press
for extensions of the Innenbereich. Additionally, the German tax system bases taxable land value upon present rather than potential use.
This mechanism serves to decrease pressure to develop land and thus
preserves the Aussenbereich:
If we could make a clear distinction between land that can and
cannot be developed, many landowners in the United States would
receive a more realistic appraisal for purposes of property taxation.
In the United States we are accustomed to assume that even if land is
presently zoned for farming, it may still be put to more profitable
uses. Absent a special statute or constitutional provision, local tax
assessors are allowed to appraise land on the basis of recent sales of
similar property even if those sales were to developers bent on speculative building. Some German cities did use a comparable system of
site-value taxation at the turn of the century in order to confiscate
potential speculative gains. Today, although there is very little reliance on the property tax, such local taxes as exist on property are
based on imputed rent value in present and not potential use.
19. See Small, Tax Benefits of Donating Easements in Scenic and Historic Property, 7 REAL
EST. L.J. 304 (1979).
20. See Currier, Exploring the Role of Taxation in the Land Use PlanningProcess, 51 IND.
L.J. 27 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Schnidman, TransferableDevelopment Rights: An Idea In Search of niplemen.
tation, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 339 (1976)."
22. See, e.g., Peterson & McCartny, FarmlandPreservationBy the Purchaseof Development
Rights: The Long IslandExperiment, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 447 (1977).
23. G. LEFCOE, supra note 10, at 48-49.
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Flying southeast over the countryside from Frankfurt to Munich, the triumph of the German city is visible. In corridors that
could have been developed with thousands of one-family houses,
there is forest (almost invariably without the second homes which
mar Northern California) and farm land (with few farmhouses because farmers live in small villages and commute to their farms).
There are no billboards even along the ribbons of the Autobahn. All
of this has been achieved with minimal public intervention because
private landowners have no right to build in undeveloped areas.
Though rural landowners have little chance of reaping vast
gains, they have some assurance that neighboring lands in a wooded
region are not going to be developed piecemeal and city residents are
assured that they can use those lands for all the recreational purposes
implied in the term "wandering." Lands are not readily transferable
from Assenbereich to Innenbereich. Property taxes are minimal and
based on present and not potential use, thereby decreasing pressure
to develop the land. These are some of the characteristics of a system of property rights from which the right to develop has been
largely if not entirely withdrawn.24
Professor Lefcoe concludes that such a system is both fair to the property owners and is a potential model for the United States.
Nevertheless, before one can accept this argument, one needs to
know more about the German law of development control2 5 and about
German society in general than what the book provides. For example,
ordered landscape where one can go to seek solace is central to the
German romantic tradition and provides a cultural barrier to expanding development that does not exist in the United States. Instead,
America reserves its spiritual constraints on land use for rugged,
unique wilderness areas and national parks. 26 However, Professor
Lefcoe's conclusion that urban land developers might prefer the German model, which has taken on added significance after the Penn Centraldecision, 27 decided after the study, will come as a surprise to many
of the players in the land development game.
Perhaps our courts are correct in refusing to help private owners
maintain what survives of the right to develop or redevelop. Individual landowners will survive limits on the right to develop, particu24. Id at 51-52 (citations omitted).
25. The administration of the German law of land development control is not without its
problems. See Dolde, Die Entwicklung des iffenlichen Baurechis ima Jahre 1976, 30 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1609 (Sept. 7, 1977).
26. See Sagoff, On Preserving the NaturalEnvironment, 84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974).
27. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

1138

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1129

larly as the scope of their affirmative rights become more clearly
defined, and property tax liabilities are adjusted to the lower land
prices that will sometimes result. We could conceivably reach a
point where landowners would no longer be able to realize windfall
gains because out-of-scale projects would be prohibited and localities
would perfect the taxation of land gains through subdivision and
other exactions. At that point legislators might be appropriately inclined to vote subsidies for landowners to restore prized older buildings and maintain valued landscapes.2 8
III.

WHEN GOVERNMENTS BECAME LAND DEVELOPERS

The final chapter argues that because of the combination of persistent
inflation, the distorting effect of federal tax laws encouraging shelters,
and the costs of environmental controls (at least in areas such as Southern California), private developers are increasingly failing to meet consumer demands for housing.29 Thus, if cities wish to concentrate urban
development to provide adequate housing opportunities while minimizing the costs of sprawl and ensuring future generations adequate
open space and prime agricultural land, "the only practical means
available. . . is by the government's assuming the role of land developer."3 This conclusion is not new. State controlled land development has long been followed in many of the social democracies of
Europe; however, as Professor Lefcoe indicates, policies promoting
massive redistribution of wealth, which led England, Holland, and
Sweden to subsidize housing by spreading the costs of public development through the tax system, will not be repeated in the United
States.3'
The argument for public land development is basically that the
public should be able to recapture the benefits of public goods, which
now go to private land developers and owners, and that public planning yields better development for more groups in society. 32 For example, more low and moderate income housing might be constructed
because the government could more easily finance initial costs and sta28. G. LEFCOE, supra note 10, at 65.
29. Id at 69-103.
30. Id at 82.
31. Id at 76. Additionally, Professor Lefcoe finds that, at the very least, the Dutch experience contributes to debate concerning the proper role of public land development. Id at 103-33.
32. Residents of Southern California will be interested in the author's discussion of the
role of public works planning in Los Angeles. Many have argued that the public works
planning process shortchanged the city on open space, but Professor Lefcoe 'argues that
the private sector (and the United States Departments of Agriculture and Interior) have
adequately responded to the demand for recreational opportunities. Id at 83-88.
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bilize interest rates through a "more steady government borrowing
33
rate."
The argument against public land development is two-fold. First,
a high risk of inefficiency exists because of the removal of property
from the tax roles and because of insufficient checks of public land
financing.
In theory, recoupment seems prudent. In practice, the holding
costs of land development and its uncertainties doom even some of
the most astute entrepreneurs; many real estate investment trusts recently went broke trying their hands at suburban land development.
Countless local governments marching into this most risky of markets-the market for developing land-where even the most knowledgeable mortgage lenders fear to tread, might as easily multiply
as
34
reduce the costs of highways and other public improvements.
Second, allowing governments to intervene affirmatively in land
markets in many ways merely advances the time when conflicts concerning the purchase choice become ripe, and thus the neighborhood
veto problem, presented above, is not avoided. For example, if a governmental unit places a low price on the land, intense development
may be encouraged at the expense of environmental goals. Moreover,
the same result may occur if the government decides to recoup its
purchase price or reap a profit on the purchase. As Professor Lefcoe
indicates, one of the most crowded areas of the Southern California
coast is Marina del Rey-a publicly developed project which resulted
in intense land development after the initial plans for a small craft harbor failed to amortize the revenue bonds sold to finance purchase of
the land.36 Marina del Rey may be a wonderful place to experience the
Los Angeles lifestyle, but one would hardly compare it to the European
new towns as an example of successful plans that balance developmental and environmental considerations.
After a thorough discussion of the risks of public land development, Professor Lefcoe surveys the Dutch experience. 37 Following a
great deal of information about the history of Dutch land development,
reclamation, and organization of the government, one learns that
Dutch projects are well-planned by American standards and incorpo33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id at 92.
Id at 85.
See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
G. LEFCOE, supra note 10, at 94.
Id at 103-33.
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rate the design innovations of the Bauhaus and of the Le Corbusier
schools. However, one also learns that the Hoog Catherijne redevelopment in Ultrecht has failed to halt suburban sprawl and that the
Bijlmermeer central high-rise project near Amsterdam, although well
designed and constructed and successful as a place to house the native
colonials from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, has been found to be
too sterile an urban environment to be reproduced. 38 This negative response to high-rise public housing projects appears to be similar to that
of the American public.
The Dutch experience is then used to evaluate tax increment
financing. This financing device is being used by many cities, especially in California, to finance urban redevelopment. It allows a city to
finance a redevelopment project by issuing bonds that are repaid solely
through the increased property tax revenues generated by the project.
Although the test of market acceptance for the bonds protects cities
against financially unsound projects, Professor Lefcoe finds that inadequate protection from a project constructed through tax increment
financing exists, distorting the planning goals of the community or of
adjoining communities because tax increment projects are undertaken
solely for fiscal reasons. Not surprisingly, the Dutch experience is seen
and interas a useful model for reform legislation to correct the intra- 39
city planning distortions of tax increment financial projects.
Professor Lefcoe ends his study on a modest as well as a pessimistic note. Because of this country's deep-seated preference for low density, detached housing, he thinks it unlikely that local and state
agencies will be delegated the necessary powers to engage in land development reform on the scale he advocates. To implement the Dutch
model, for example, the land development agency must have "a near
monopoly on all land in each market area" 40 where development is
undertaken.
There are two reasons, however, why the author's pessimism may
be misplaced and why the study may have more relevance than the
author suspects. Each reason is a separate topic in itself, accordingly, I
will mention only them briefly here. First, the growing realization that
deficiencies in the supply of energy will become a chronic problem
makes plausible the development of an energy conservation strategy
38.
39.

Id at 120-29.
See generally WOOLERY, THE USES AND ABUSES OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN

LAND USE POLICIES TO ACHIEVE LAND-USE GOALS (1978).
40. G. LEFCOE, supra note I0,at 136.
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based on compact, higher density land development. 4 ' Second, as the
author briefly recognizes at the end of the book, it is possible that many
of the results he advocates might be reached by the opposite reform
policy. The European experience points toward greater centralized
control over land use decisions. However, potent arguments are being
raised that the current unsatisfactory state of urban growth is the result
of the failure to decentralize the system through the explicit assignment
of property rights to neighbors and42 municipalities and the subsequent
sale of these rights on the market.
On one level, proposals such as land banking, which call for
greater central planning, are inconsistent with recent suggestions to create markets in development rights. It is possible, however, to marry the
two ideas by confining planning to macro decisions about the location
and density of various uses, leaving the market to implement the land
use allocations. Such a marriage might have the benefit of providing
substantial public benefits at the same time that development decisions
are freed from the costly and often trivial controls imposed by the existing regulatory system. This is not the book Professor Lefcoe set out
to write, nevertheless, much of what he has to say is useful in evaluating the numerous decentralization reforms now being proposed, and
one sign of a good book is that it says more than its author originally
intended.

41. See C. HARWOOD, USING LAND TO SAVE ENERGY (1977).
42. See generally R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION (1977).

